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. Facs
Jason Scott Byram ("Byram7) stabbedJulie Johnson ("Johnson") at around
3:00 a.nm. to silence her while he was robbing her family's house. Byram left a
fingerprint in the house and the dying Johnson told the police that the attacker
acted alone. Acting on the evidence collected, the police arrested Byram that
afternoon and he confessed to the crime. Byram was convicted by a jury in
South Carolina state court "of murder, first-degree burglary, attempted armed
robbery, and grand larceny of a motor vehicle."'
During the sentencing phase of trial, Byram's defense counsel, Douglas
Strickler ("Strickler") and Lee Coggiola ("Coggiola"), presented mitigating
evidence Strickler and Coggiola employed the services of a forensic psychiatrist,
a forensic psychologist, a social worker, and an investigator in preparing Byram's
mitigation evidence.' The social worker, Evelyn Califf ("Califf"), met with Byramr
five times and reviewed his school and foster care records.4 Califf was certified
by the trial court as an expert in adoptions and learning disabilities and testified
during sentencing about Byram's abusive childhood, slow development, difficul-
ties in school, and his "dull normal" intelligence.' In addition, the investigator,
Patti Rickbom, helped prepare the mitigation evidence, contacted Byram's
natural and adoptive family members, and obtained Byram's adoption records."
Despite the evidence and testimony produced by the defense team, the jury
recommended the death penalty.7 After reviewing the jury's recommendation,
the trial judge sentenced Byramto death.' The Supreme Court of South Carolina
affirmed the conviction and sentence and subsequently denied Byram a rehear-
ing.9
1. Byram v. Ozmint, 339 F.3d 203, 205 (4th ar. 2003).
2. Id at 206. The court noted the experience that both Strickler and Coggiola had in
representing capital defendants, which included Stricider's involvement in two death penakycases
and Cogiola's work at the Death Penalty Resource Center. Id at 205. The court noted thatStrickler had logged 623.5 hours preparing Byram's case, and Coggiola testified that she had met
with Byram at least thirty times prior to the trial. Id at 205-06.




7. Bam 339 F.3d at 206.
8. Id
9. Id; see State v. Byram, 485 S.El2d 360, 367 (S.C 1997) (affirming the state trial court
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Byram was denied postconviction relief by the state courts and he filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina." The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the State but issued Byram a certificate of appealability ("(OA")."
Byram then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit.' 2
I. Hddig
The Fourth Crcuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment dis-
missal.'3 First, the court held that the state court did not unreasonably apply
Batsonv Karude94 byfinding that defense counsel's peremptorychallenges were
permissible strategic decisions." Second, the court held that the state court did
not unreasonably apply Stridari v Washbti 6 when it found that defense
counsel's mitigation evidence investigation was adequate and did not prejudice
the defense.'
III. A msIs
Byram presented two claims to the Fourth Circuit: (1) his counsel rendered
ineffective assistance during jury selection when they "used peremptory chal-
lenges to strike potential jurors for reasons of race," which violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) his counsel rendered
ineffective assistance during the sentencing proceedings when they failed to
investigate or present adequate mitigation evidence. 8 The Fourth Circuit stated
that for a writ of habeas corpus to issue the state court must have rendered a
decision that was " 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States."" 9 The court noted that in Wdliarm v Toko1 the Supreme Court
proceedinigs).
10. Bran; 339 F.3d at 206.
11. Id
12. Id
13. Id at 211.
14. 476 US. 79 (1986).
15. B)mm 339 F.3d at 208-09; seeBatson v. Kentucky, 476 US. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that
peremptory challenges based solely on race are constitutionally impermissible on equal protection
grounds).
16. 466 US. 668 (1984).
17. By'am, 339 F.3d at 209-11; sw Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)
(creating a two-pronged test for determining ineffective assistance of counsel).
18. Byran 339 F.3d at 207; see US. CONST. amend. XIV (providing that "[n]o State shall..
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
19. Byw, 339 F.3d at 206 (quoting 28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000));see 28 U.S.C S 2254(d) (1)
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held that an application of clearly established federal law by a lower court is
unreasonable if it identifies the correct legal rule but unreasonably applies it to
the defendant's case."
A. The Batson Issue
Byram first argued that his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance
when they used nine out of ten peremptory challenges to exclude white jurors
and then used four additional challenges to exclude white jury alternates.22 The
Supreme Court previouslyheld that the Constitution prohibits both the prosecu-
tion and the defense from using peremptory challenges for race-based reasons.23
In Miller-El v CGokdl,2  the Supreme Court restated the three-part test for
determining whether a violation of Batson has occurred." First, a party opposing
a challenge must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has
been used based on a juror's race.26 Second, if the first part of the test is satis-
fied, the party making the challenge must offer a race-neutral reason for exclud-
ing the juror.2 Third, in light of the evidence submitted, the trial court is re-
quired to determine whether the party opposing the challenge "has shown
purposeful discrimination.""
During the state postconviction relief ("PCR") proceedings, Strickler
testified that he was aware of studies showing that African American jurors were
less likely to vote for the death penalty than jurors of other races.29 Strickler
further testified that his personal experience led him to believe that African
(2000) (providing that a writ of habeas corpus following the conclusion of state court proceedings
can only be granted if the state court decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law"; part of AEDPA).
20. 529 US. 362 (2000).
21. Bymrn 339 F.3d at 207; seeWlliams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,407-08 (2000) (holding that
an application of clearly established federal law is unreasonable if it "correctly identifies the
governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case").
22. Byntm? 339 F.3d at 207. The court properly refrained from revealing Byram's race in the
written opinion because the Fourteenth Amendment rights at issue in this case were those of the
jurors not to be excluded and not Byram's right to have a same-race jury.
23. Id; se Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (holding that the Constitution
forbids the defendant from using peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors because of their
race); Batsm, 476 US. at 89 ("[The Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge
potential jurors solelyon account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group Will
be unable impartally to consider the State's case against a black defendant.").
24. 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
25. Byrm 339 F.3d at 207; seeMfiller-El v. Cockrell, 537 US. 322, 328-39 (2003) (restating
the three-part test created in Batso).
26. Mifer-E4 537 US. at 328 (citing Batsom 476 U.S. at 96-106).
27. Id (citing Ba , 476 U.S. at 97-106).
28. Id at 328-29 (citing Ba&r, 476 U.S. at 98, 106).
29. Byrarn 339 F.3d at 207.
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American jurors were more likely to express their opposition to the death
penalty." As further evidence of Strickler's racial bias in selecting jurors, Byram
pointed to Strickler's trial notes, which indicated "whether certain members of
the venire were black or white.""' The Fourth Crcuit noted that "[i]n Batson
inquiries 'the decisive question will be whether counsel's race-neutral explanation
for a peremptorychallenge should be believed.' 32 Further, the court stated that
the best evidence of counsel's intention when challenging jurors is the demeanor
of the attorneyat the time of the challenge, a credibilitydetermination best made
by the trial judge."
At trial, the prosecution "requested a Batson hearing to determine the
reasons for defense counsel's peremptorychallenges of white jurors."34 The trial
judge required defense counsel to give the reasons behind each juror's challenge
because the Solicitor was dissatisfied with Strickler's explanation of their "rating
system," in which theyfirst determined the suitabilityof a juror, then tried to seat
jurors who scored high on the scale." After receiving race-neutral explanations
for each challenged juror, the trial judge held that there was insufficient evidence
of a racial motive behind the challenges to invalidate the peremptories 6
On federal habeas review, the district court upheld the trial court's determi-
nation and found that it was not an unreasonable application of Batson' For the
Fourth Circuit to overturn the district court's determination, the court must have
found the trial court's application of BAzsn to be "objectively unreasonable."38
The court held that a "juror's inclination to impose the death penaltyis a legiti-
mate consideration in counsel's exercise of peremptory challenges."39 Thus, the
court affirmed the district court's determination that the trial court's application
of Baon was not an unreasonable application of clearlyestablished federal law.4
30. kd
31. kd
32. Id at 208 (quoting Miller.E, 537 US. at 339) (internal citation omitted).
33. Id
34. Id
35. Bywa 339 F.3d at 208.
36. Id
37. Id at 208-09.
38. Id (citing Midkr-El, 537 US. at 340-41).
39. Id (citing United States v. Bamette, 211 F.3d 803, 811 (4th Cir. 2000)).
40. Id at 208-09;see28 US.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000). Althoughnotcited bythe Fourth Circuit,
the Supreme Court has held that an appellate court should defer to the trial court's determination
that counsel's challenges were not racially motivated unless that determination was clearlyerrone-
ous. SeHerandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352,363-65,372 (1991) mpluraliy opinion) (upholding





Byram also claimed that his counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective
assistance because they "did not have a coherent strategy for developing all
available mitigation evidence." 1 According to Byram, this failure did not allow
the jury to hear evidence of Byram's brain damage from fetal alcohol syndrome
("FAS") and of the abuse and neglect he suffered as a child.42 Byram argued that
this failure violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel
and undermined confidence in the sentencing proceedings.
43
In Stride/a r the Supreme Court created a two-pronged test for deciding
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.44 "First, the defendant 'must show that
counsel's performance was deficient.' "" To prove deficient performance, the
defendant must show that " 'counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.' "' The Fourth Grcuit noted that the Supreme
Court has held that limited investigations maybe permissible as justification for
strategic decisions when " 'reasonable professional judgments support the
limitations on investigation.' "4' For the second prong of the Stride/ari analysis,
a defendant must prove that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.4 ' A defendant proves prejudice byshowing that" 'counsel's errors were
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair triaL' "' The Fourth Crcuit was
required to" 'reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totalityof available
mitigating evidence'" to determine if Byram was prejudiced during the sentenc-
ing proceedings.' The court undertook a preliminary analysis of the two-
pronged test in order to determine if the state court's application of Siklanrdwas
unreasonable under S 2254(d)(1). 1
The court observed that the Supreme Court has held that "[i]t is the respon-
sibilityof counsel to adequatelyinvestigate and present evidence in mitigation."
2
41. Byrn 339 F.3d at 209.
42. Id
43. Id; see US. CONST. amend. VI (stating that "[in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence").
44. Byarr 339 F.3d at 209; seStridlr 466 U.S. at 687 (holding that to prove ineffective
assistance of counsel defendant "must showthat counsels performance was deficient" and that the
deficiency prejudiced the defense to such a degree so "as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial").
45. Byran; 339 F.3d at 209 (quoting Styi&kz r 466 U.S. at 687).
46. Id (quoting Sti&1ra* 466 US. at 688).
47. Id (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. C. 2527, 2541 (2003)) (citation omitted).
48. Id; see Stpia1k4 466 U.S. at 687 (holding that deficient performance of counsel must
have prejudiced the defense so as to deny the defendant a fair trial).
49. Byrrr 339 F.3d at 209 (quoting StrickLa 466 U.S. at 687).
50. Id (quoting W'gim, 123 S. C. at 2542).
51. Id at 209 (citing Mil.E 537 U.S. at 338); sw28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000) (providing
standard for issuance of writ of habeas corpus).
52. Byr=w 339 F.3d at 209 (citing lW&im, 529 US. at 395).
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However, the investigation for mitigating evidence is required onlyto be reason-
able and a reviewing court must give deference to counsel's strategic decisions
concerning the presentation of evidence." The court must assume that" 'coun-
sel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'
1)54 The court found that Byram did not meet the burden of Stri&kmd and that
defense counsel's performance did not fall "below an objective standard of
reasonableness.""5 The court pointed out that Strickler and Coggiola devoted a
significant amount of time to preparing Byram's case. 6 Further, Strickler and
Coggiola employed a forensic psychologist and a forensic psychiatrist ("the
experts"), each of whomprovided reports after examining Byram." Strickler and
Coggiola concluded that the evidence produced by the experts' examinations
would have been more damaging than helpful to the defense and decided not to
present the experts' testimony.5" The court found counsel's choices to be
reasonable because such evidence" 'is a double-edged sword that might as easily
have condemned defendant to death as excused his actions.'""'
The court distinguished Byram's case from the facts in Wgim v Snih,6 in
which defense counsel was found to have conducted an inadequate investigation
into mitigating evidence. 6 In Wimu, the Supreme Court found that defense
counsel ended their" 'investigation at an unreasonable juncture.' "62 Specifically,
defense counsel possessed evidence that would have led a competent attoineyto
conduct a further investigation."3 Unlike ftim, the court in Byram found that
Strickler and Coggiola conducted an adequate investigation to justify their
strategic decision to limit their investigation and not present all the mitigating
evidence in their possession." In addition to the psychiatric experts, defense
counsel employed a social worker who produced a psychosocial assessment of
Byram for use during the sentencing proceedings and hired a private investigator
to help develop mitigating evidence.65 According to Strickler and Coggiola, the
53. Id; seeMatthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907,919 (4th Or. 1997) (holding that counsel is only
required to make a reasonable investigation into possible mitigating evidence).
54. B'yam 339 F.3d at 209 (quoting Styi&&a4 466 US. at 689).
55. Id
56. Id at 209-10.
57. Id at 210.
58. Id
59. Id (quoting Truesdale v. Moore, 142 F.3d 749, 755 (4th Cr. 1998)).
60. 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003).
61. Brwnn 339 F3d at 210; see Wgru, 123 S. Ct. at 2538 (finding that defense counsel's
investigation fell well short of established professional norms).
62. Byran 339 F.3d at 210 (quoting WVrquz, 123 S. Cr_ at 2538).
63. gji, 123 S. Cr. at 2538.
64. Byran4 339 F.3d at 210-211.
65. Id at 210.
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evidence culled by the experts, the social worker, and the investigator did not
reveal any basis for presenting FAS as evidence in mitigation.66
The court further differentiated Byram's case by stating that Byram's
counsel did not put on a "halfhearted mitigation case" as Wiggins's counsel did.67
The jury in Btram heard "extensive testimony and arguments regarding Byram's
troubled childhood and adolescence."68 According to the court, Strickler devoted
significant time and effort to Byram's case and provided credible explanations at
the PCRproceedings for their strategic choices.69 The court found no reasonable
probability that had defense counsel conducted a more exhaustive investigation
the outcome of the trial would have been different." In conclusion, the court
held that Byram failed to show that the state court's application of Strk/a,4was
unreasonable."
IV. AppW xmin v
A. Batson
Under Byrrm, a defendant can dismiss pro-death penalty jurors using
peremptorystrikes. Defense counsel mayexclude those jurors who express an
inclination to impose the death penalty so long as race is not considered, thus
avoiding a conflict with Batscn and Georgia v McCc/Jwn 73 The analog to this
position is that prosecutors can likewise exclude anti-death penaltyjurors without
fear of coming under a Bascn attack If a prosecutor were to exclude African
American jurors he decided were anti-death penalty, his actions could be justified
in the same manner by proffering a race-neutral explanation. Thus, while it
seems that defense counsel can eliminate pro-death jurors without relying solely
on race, it must be understood that the Commonwealth can employ the same
tactic.
StrickIer's testimony in the PCR proceedings and his explanations for the
challenges were inconsistent."l He revealed in the PCR proceedings his bias
towards retaining African American jurors for their alleged anti-death penalty
66. Id For a complete discussion and analysis of W agi, see generally Terrence T. Egland,
Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF.J. 101 (2003) (analyzing Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. C. 2527 (2003)).




71. Id at 211.
72. Id at 208; see Barn 211 F.3d at 811 (allowing the peremptory challenge of decidedly
anti-death penatyjurors).
73. Se Baacn, 476 U.S. at 89 (forbidding the use of peremptory challenges by prosecution
based on race); McC & 505 US. at 59 (forbidding the use of peremptory challenges bydefense
based on race).
74. B ram4 339 F3d at 207-08.
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inclination, yet at trial Strickler explained his challenges in race-neutral terms as
the result of either the potential jurors' statements or their relationship with the
trial actors." The court, while ruling that Strickler's challenges were valid, gave
no weight to Strickler's testinionyin the PCR hearings that revealed an inconsis-
tency in his rationale between the Bason hearing at trial and the PCR
proceedings. 6 Thus, the court implied that race can be a consideration, so long
as at trial there is a race-neutral explanation for the challenges."
B. Wiggins
Defense counsel must also be aware of the impact Byramhas on the gather-
ing of mitigation evidence. Byram stands for the proposition that so long as
defense counsel properly uses the resources provided by the Commonwealth,
such as a mitigation specialist, fact investigator, or psychiatrist, any ineffective
assistance of counsel claim concerning the investigation of mitigation evidence
will fail. 78 If, on the other hand, the resources are used improperly, the ineffec-
tive assistance claim can prevail 9 In Win, defense counsel failed to employ
a mitigation specialist when the state provided funds for that verypurpose." The
Supreme Court found that this was an indication of performance that fell below
professional norms." When defense counsel has access to the tools needed to
cultivate a mitigation defense, failure to utilize them will most likely amount to
ineffective assistance.
V. CCIJw'K
Defense counsel must be aware that the abilityto challenge potential jurors
with pro-death penalty views may be nullified by the counter-ability of the
Commonwealth to challenge anti-death penaltymembers of the venire. Further,
the importance of the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence in the
75. Id
76. Id at 208-09 (holding that credibility of attorney's explanation of challenge is best
assessed by the trial court).
77. Id It is interesting to note that if, as Strickler believed, African American jurors were
likelyto express openlytheir opposition to the death penalty, then the African American jurors who
were not challenged were presumably pro-death penalty jurors. Id at 207. Thus, his intention to
retain anti-death penalty jurors was frustrated by his own racial bias.
78. Id at 209-11;swEgland, s"m note 66, at 111 (arguing that W' v makes the appoint-
ment of a mitigation specialist in all capital cases mandatory). See gr4d Daniel L. Payne, A
Ma $mSp iaist a NesityariaMaterfRi 16 CAP. DEF.J. 43 (2003). Please contact the
Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse at (540) 458-8557 for a motion requesting the appointment of
a mitigation specialist.
79. See W'gin, 123 S. Q. at 2536-37 (stating that failure to utilize forensic social worker
when funds were available for that purpose fell below Maryland and ABA professional standards).
80. Id at 2533.
81. Id at 2536-37.
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sentencing phase of a capital trial cannot be overstated. However, it is clear, at
least in the Fourth Crcuit, that there is a threshold level of investigation that
defense counsel can meet to assure that the court will not question strategic
decisions.
Terrence T. Egland

